By Ellie Brem; Image by NBC News
On April 15th of this year, conflict erupted in Sudan for the first time since 2019 (Walsh and Dahir 2023).
Sudan has been in what sometimes seems like a perpetual state of conflict since its independence from colonial powers in 1956. Since then, Sudan has experienced three devastating civil wars between the North and South of the country, beginning in the 1950s and continuing into the 21st century. These wars involved mass displacement, egregious violence against civilians, and killing along ethnic divides. In the early 2000s, Sudan’s government perpetuated genocide against minority populations in the country’s western region, Darfur. Even though South Sudan was able to secede in 2011, the new state erupted in conflict by 2013, which did not cease until 2018, and threatens to continue in the future (Council on Foreign Relations 2023).
Despite this legacy of violence, Sudan experienced a chance at peace in 2019. A non-violent popular revolution led in large part by Sudan’s youth deposed the country’s long-time dictator, Omar al-Bashir (McGinley 2023). The protestors called for the creation of a democratic and representative government who would serve the needs of the people (Srinivasan 2023). For the first time, it seemed to many that Sudan had a chance at a peaceful future.
Unfortunately, this hope was short-lived. Just 18 months after the revolution and deposition of al-Bashir, Sudan’s government was seized by two military generals (Walsh 2023). General Abdul Fattah al-Burhan, commonly known as Burhan, and General Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo, commonly known as Hemedti, had both served under former President al-Bashir. With the combined force of their respective military factions, they assisted with the overthrow of al-Bashir and established a Transitional Military Council. In doing this, the generals cleared a space for themselves in the new government.
For fear of reigniting violence in Sudan, foreign peacemakers and diplomats worked with the generals to create a technocratic transition plan for the new government. In doing so, the international facilitators of peace in Sudan made a grave mistake. Burhan and Hemedti were able to insert themselves into the creation of Sudan’s new government by threatening violence. Foreign peacemakers legitimized these actors by recognizing and working with them. This not only enabled the bargaining power of violence, it also led other armed groups to insert themselves in the peace process (Srinivasan 2023).
Ultimately, Sudan’s popular revolution was stopped in its tracks, and yet another military regime was allowed to take its place. While initially promising to support the civilian-led government, the two generals orchestrated a coup in 2021. Predictably, the generals rejected what was meant to be a peaceful transition to a democratic government in the hands of the people. In 2023, infighting between the generals ignited over who would control the government. This violence has spread throughout Sudan, threatening the political stability of the country and region.
Already, we are seeing humanitarian costs and the potential for a refugee crisis. Unfortunately, the devastating cycle of hope for change that ultimately devolves into infighting continues to plague Sudan.
How many times will this pattern be repeated? How many times will foreign institutions ignore the nuance of conflict in countries stricken by violence? How many times will a popular democratic process be begun, only to backslide into an authoritarian regime?
Sudan had a chance to create a government that would serve its people and foster peace and stability. Sudan’s people had the will and intention to see this government through. But as often happens, the process was hijacked. Generals Burhan and Hemedti involved themselves in the peace process, and were legitimized by the international actors involved in the creation of the new government. Had the creation of Sudan’s government, as inspired by 2019’s popular revolution, been left in the hands of Sudan’s civil society, it is possible that a stable Sudanese government could have been established. International and regional organizations could have funded and military supported the civilian revolution, legitimizing the people instead of military generals. Unfortunately, this did not happen. Instead, Sudan has once again joined the legacy of failed peace processes.
References:
“Instability in South Sudan: Global Conflict Tracker.” Council on Foreign Relations: Center for Preventative Action. August 8, 2023.
https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-south-sudan.
Walsh, Declan and Abdi Latif Dahir. “War in Sudan: Who Is Battling for Power, and Why it Hasn’t Stopped.” The New York Times, October 26, 2023.
https://www.nytimes.com/article/sudan-khartoum-military.html?searchResultPosition=15. Walsh, Declan. “2 Generals Took Over a Country. Will They Deliver Democracy or War?” The New York Times, April 6, 2023.
https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/06/world/africa/sudan-generals-coup-civilian-rule.html. Srinivasan, Sharath. “Support Sudan’s Revolution, Not an Elite Peace Deal.” Foreign Policy, June 29, 2023.
https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/06/29/sudan-revolution-burhan-hemeti-peace-process/.
